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INTRODUCTION
Following the British privatization in the 1980s, various countries around the world liberalized their electricity sectors. Today, in most industrialized countries only network facilities remain regulated while private firms decide on investment in generation capacities, and trade electricity on markets. This structure challenges the planning of transmission and generation capacity expansion.
While an entirely regulated electricity sector allows for simultaneous transmission and generation expansion planning, in a liberalized market, investment decisions in transmission and generation capacities are taken by different agents. Investment in generation capacities is typically made by firms and private investors, based on their expectations concerning the future regulatory environment and taking into account available network facilities. Network expansion, however, is decided on by regulated firms (or even the regulator), in anticipation of capacity investments by private firms.
Traditional optimization approaches, while they reveal the optimal expansion plan for transmission and generation, do not offer valuable information on how to achieve those goals in a market environment. In a liberalized market, incentives induced by the interplay of market environment and regulation determine whether firms indeed make the appropriate investment choices. Liberalized electricity markets thus call for new tools to inform the various agents involved -regulators, electricity firms, investors, and other stakeholders.
In this paper we propose a model that allows to analyze investment in transmission expansion (by the transmission operator) and generation expansion (by firms) in liberalized electricity markets.
We model environments with energy only markets and a regulated transmission operator who uses redispatch to deal with transmission constraints. In a multistage analysis we study transmission expansion decisions by the regulated transmission operator in anticipation of capacity expansion by private firms. In different specifications of our model we analyze the effects of market splitting (one versus multiple price zones) as well as different approaches to recover network cost, in particular lump sum, capacity based, and generation based fees. In order to compare the outcomes to the First Best we also solve the integrated planer problem. In this paper we restrict ourselves to solving stylized test cases to illustrate the applicability of our framework. Our results demonstrate that investment choices in a market environment can substantially differ from First Best solution. In our numerical examples, the absence of proper locational investment incentives for firms clearly affects investment choices of generators, which, in turn, leads to excessive line investment. Our results demonstrate that our model allows to compare different network management regimes and assess their effects on long run investment decisions. Our approach is, thus, an important extension Let us emphasize that our approach allows to assess the impact of different regulatory regimes on investment under conditions that obtain in various industrialized countries around the world.
Especially in Europe, spot market trading does not fully account for transmission constraints, but capacities are shut down and called for by the transmission operator in case the spot market solution is not feasible. Under cost based redispatch (as it is used in Austria, Switzerland, or Germany) firms called into operation are just compensated for their variable production cost. Consequently, redispatch operations cannot contribute to the recovery of investment costs. 1 Several countries thus try to induce adequate locational investment incentives via market splitting, i.e the establishment of predefined zones where different spot market prices obtain in case of transmission constraints. As it is well known, various countries outside Europe go even further and introduced variants of nodal pricing (Australia, New Zealand, Russia or the United States, see Joskow, 2008) , where electricity prices reflect transmission constraints and induce adequate locational investment incentives for generation capacities run by private firms. Since in our framework the first best solution coincides with the outcome under nodal pricing, our approach also allows to assess the long run benefits from a change to a nodal pricing system.
Let us briefly illustrate the relevance of our model for important policy considerations by example.
In 2011, after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the German government decided to shut down all nuclear power plants by 2020 . At the same time, renewable production was heavily promoted.
Those developments caused an increasing concentration of generation capacities in the northern part of the country, since cheap wind power and coal plants have locational advantages there. In the south, increasing photovoltaic capacities require a backup to compensate for fluctuations in production. Alternative solutions to these problems are e.g. investment in gas plants located in the south or transmission line expansion to provide the south with power from the north. While global optimization suggests that gas plants solve arising problems at lower cost, the current German regulation does not provide sufficient investment incentives. As a consequence a substantial expansion of transmission capacities is planned, implying investment cost of over 30 bn. Euro. Power market models as the one suggested in this paper enable us to (i) identify those problems and their causes, and (ii) to analyse and compare different regulatory regimes that might be capable to induce adequate investment incentives. In the case of the German market sketched above, interesting scenarios include market splitting (so that producers in the south are rewarded for their locational choice) and changes in the redispatch system (to a system that rewards the right locational choices).
Both measures would make production in the south more profitable and could contribute to increased investment incentives in the relevant locations.
We finally review the related literature. Prior to the liberalization of electricity sectors around the world, vertically integrated monopolists (either regulated or directly state owned) were responsible for generation and transmission expansion. To achieve their goals they needed insights on the cost minimal system configuration. As a consequence, traditionally, most of the contributions thus proposed frameworks and techniques to determine overall optimal expansion for generation and (2013) propose an auction mechanism to implement optimal investment incentives by transmission companies. Those approaches, however, do not explicitly take into account the specific structure of the transmission management regime, but implicitly assume optimal management of the transmission network which is implemented by a regime of LMPs. While this nicely models incentives in markets where indeed a system of LMPs is implemented (as for example in the US or Canada), it limits insights with respect to other markets, which might rely on a system of market splitting/coupling and redispatch/countertrading which is not captured by the above modelling approaches. It is the purpose of our article to explicitly analyze the impact of specific design features of load management regimes as market splitting and redispatch on the generation and transmission investment incentives.
Let us note at this point that in recent years an extensive literature has developed that analyzes the impact of the specific rules of the load management regime on short run market outcomes, i.e. for while it is our purpose to consider the long run effects on investment incentives. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present our theoretical framework. In section 3
we introduce the integrated planer approach, while section 4 presents the tri-level model with a cost-based redispatch system and market splitting. The tri-level model is reformulated using new decomposition ideas in section 5. The last part of our paper, in section 6, presents numerical results for test networks that illustrate applicability of our model. Section 7 concludes. Figure 1 depicts an electricity network with nine nodes, three price zones Z = {(1, 2), (3, 4, 5, 6), (7, 8, 9 )} (grey areas) and eleven existing transmission lines of two different line types L = {1, 2}. Line type l = 1 is characterized by a thermal capacity of 1000 and a susceptance of 1 (solid arrows). Analogous, line type l = 2 has a thermal capacity of 500 and a susceptance of 0.5 (dashed arrows). This transmission network yields the following subsets of network links (3, 4) , (3, 6) , (4, 5) , (5, 6) , (6, 8) , (7, 8) 2.3. Demand. We denote demand nodes in the network by D ⊂ N . Consumers are located exclusively at those demand nodes, i.e., by assumption demand is zero at any other node n ∈ N \ D in the network. We model elastic demand at a given demand node d ∈ D, in any given period t ∈ T , by continuous, strictly monotonic decreasing functions , to which we will refer to as the gross consumer surplus at node d in period t, is always convex, which is for instance the case for linear non-increasing demand functions.
2.4. Investment. Let G al l n denote the set of technologies that firms can potentially dispose of in at a given network node n ∈ N . We will use the notations G e x n for already existing generation technologies at node n ∈ N . G new n will be used for candidate generation technologies that can be build at node 2.6. Network Fees. In the power market model the transmission operator has to collect network fees in order to cover expenses arising from i) line investment and ii) redispatch. We denote the revenue from fee collection by R. We consider three different types of network fee regimes (see also Section 4.2).
• Lump Sum: We denote by λ a lump sum fee paid by the consumers:
• Transmission Based Fee: We denote by ρ a per unit fee charged for each unit of electricity actually transmitted through the network. The corresponding revenue R ρ is given by
• Capacity Based Fee: We denote by κ a per unit fee charged for each unit of (generation) capacity connected to the network. Revenues R κ generated under this regime is
THE INTEGRATED PLANNING APPROACH AS A FIRST BEST BENCHMARK
As the first best benchmark we consider the integrated planning approach where an Integrated Generation and Transmission Company (IGTC) decides simultaneously on transmission and generation capacity expansion and chooses welfare maximizing production at the spot markets. 2 The IGTC maximizes total social welfare which is defined as the difference of gross consumer surplus (aggregate over all demand scenarios) and (i) generation investment cost, (ii) line investment cost as well as (iii) variable production cost (see (3.1) ). Note that our approach yields the same investment Considering different economic and physical constraints, the IGTC faces the following intertemporal optimization problem:
It is well known that the integrated planner approach yields the same outcome as a nodal price system in the short run (see, for instance, Hogan (2002) ). Analogously, our results in section 5 imply that the solution of the long run integrated planner approach (the First Best) is equivalent to the outcome of a three-level nodal pricing model which also accounts for investments in transmission and generation capacity. In such a model, a regulated transmission operator decides on transmission expansion at the first stage. At the second stage, competitive firms decide on generation expansion investment and spot market bids. At the third stage, the transmission operator decides on the welfare maximizing feasible allocation and implements nodal prices. 
Voltage Phase Angle of Reference Node (VPA):
Transmission Flow Limits (TFL):
Generation Capacity Limits (GCL):
Variable Restrictions (VR):
Let us briefly explain the different constraints the IGTC is facing:
• First Kirchhoff's Law (see (3.2)) ensures power balance or flow conservation at any node n ∈ N in the electricity network. To ensure flow balance, total power flow out of node n ∈ N in any given period t ∈ T must equal the sum of power flows in node n ∈ N .
• Constraints (3.3) to (3.6) correspond to Second Kirchhoff's Law and determine, together with the constraint group (3.7) the network's phase angles (and network flows).
• Constraint (3.7) ensures that the phase angle of node 1, the reference node of our network, equals zero in all periods t ∈ T .
• The transmission flow limit constraints in (3.8) and (3.9) guarantee that on a given transmission line total power flow always lies between its lower and upper bound. Here, line investment is explicitly taken into account.
• The next group of constraints, the generation capacity limits (constraints (3.10) to (3.11)), ensure that electricity production does not exceed installed generation capacity. These constraints explicitly account for the efficiency of the considered technologies.
• The last constraint group, (3.12) to (3.14) and (3.15), guarantees certain model variables being nonnegative and binary, respectively.
Note that by summing up (3.2) for all network nodes n ∈ N yields the market clearing condition:
THE TRI-LEVEL POWER MARKET MODEL
In most European countries, spot market trading does not fully account for network constraints (if at all). Therefore, congestion management mechanisms and the way network fees are collected play a crucial role for investment incentives, both, in network and generation capacity expansion.
While it is most likely, that energy-only markets with redispatch do not result in an optimal incentive structure, the questions remain open (i) how far away we are from the first best and (ii) whether alternative mechanisms have the potential to improve the situation substantially.
In our power market model we consider an energy only market with cost-based redispatch, which is implemented in several European countries. Electricity trading and dispatch is organized as follows in such a system: Firms trade electricity day ahead (and possibly intra-day) at a power exchange that does not account for any transmission constraints. After closing of the market, the transmission operator (TO) checks feasibility of the resulting transmission flows. If the allocation is feasible, nothing is changed and electricity is generated and consumed as traded. If transmission is infeasible, the TO redispatches plants in the cheapest possible way that ensures feasibility of transmission flows.
To that aim the TO obliges producers to (partially) shut down production and others on the other side of the congested link are called to step in instead. Plants that are shut down have to pay their marginal cost (that they save due to the shutdown) to the TO, while plants that are called to step in receive their variable production cost. Production cost of the called plants are necessarily higher than production cost of the plants shut down, since otherwise they would have been successful at the spot market. The resulting cost is collected by the TO through transmission fees. While in the early days of liberalized electricity markets redispatch was a rare event, nowadays the phenomenon becomes more and more important. See ENTSO-E (2012) for the case of Germany, where the decision to shut down nuclear power plants and increase the installation of renewables implies a much more uncertain supply structure.
Example 4.1. Before we formally introduce our power market model with cost-based redispatch, we briefly illustrate the main effects of cost-based redispatch in a stylized market with a simple two-node network. In the two-node network demand is located at the northern node and production is only feasible at the southern node (see also Figure 3 ). We further assume that demand is linear and that there is only one generator with constant marginal production cost. As illustrated by Figure 3 , the demand function intersects the supply function (given by the constant marginal cost of production)
in the point A. This determines the equilibrium market price C and the equilibrium quantity B. In the case of unlimited transmission capacities, the quantity B will be produced and consumed. However, if the market faces physical transmission constraints this is not possible. As shown in Figure 3 , D is the maximum amount of electricity that can be transmitted from the production node to the consumption node. In this simplified scenario 'redispatch' implies that the transmission operator adjusts both demand and supply in order to meet the transmission capacity constraint at D. To this aim the TO obliges consumers (namely those with the lowest willingnesses to pay) to step back from their contracts. As a compensation, the TO pays these consumers the amount equal to the area of the polygon ABDF . Additionally, the transmission operator asks firms (typically those with the highest marginal cost, here marginal cost are the same) to shut down their production to an extent that resolves the congestion problem. The respective firms pay an amout equal to the area of the rectangle ABDE to the transmission operator, which corresponds exactly to the variable costs that do not arise due to the redispatch. Obviously, the redispatch mechanism has no impact on the firms' profits if they are asked to decrease production. However, for the TO redispatch implies additional cost equal to the area of the triangle AE F that occur due to the reallocation procedure.
These additional costs must be collected from the market participants when collecting network fees.
Formal Representation as a Tri-Level Programming Problem.
Let us briefly sketch the structure of our model before we introduce the details at all levels. We consider a hierarchical tri-level problem that corresponds to a multistage game, where the transmission operator (TO) decides TO (who is driven by welfare concerns), firms take investment and supply decisions as to maximize profits. We assume competitive spot markets (no market power) and spot market rules yield no price signals that point to transmission constraints (energy only market). Redispatch at the T subsequent spot markets is modelled at the third level and taken into account by firms when they decide on investment and supply schemes at level two. Redispatch occurs whenever traded quantities turn out to be infeasible given transmission constraints. The TO redispatches plants as to minimize redispatch costs, which he/she recovers through network fees. Note that consideration of redispatch in a separate third stage is possible since, once network and generation capacities have been chosen, redispatch at time t cannot have any impact on supply decisions at any later point in time. Figure   5 illustrates the structure of our tri-level power market model. We point out that all levels of our power market model are interconnected: the competitive firms' investment and optimal spot market Let us finally emphasize that our power market model specification allows to account for multiple price zones Z 1 , . . . , Z |Z| , which enables us to investigate the effect of market splitting on the extent of (cost of) redispatch. Under market splitting, spot market trading does take into account parts of the possible network constraints between (but not within) zones. At the first level the TO maximizes social welfare, which comprises of consumer surplus from all markets minus investment and generation cost. The budget constraint (R = E) allows to consider all three network fee regimes referred to in Section 2.6. We obtain the following line investment optimization problem: The generation and supply market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, i.e., no firm can directly affect prices by strategic investment or supply decisions. It has been shown in the literature 6 that a perfectly competitive environment yields welfare maximizing investment and production decisions 5 All variables that are determined on the second stage will be denoted by x. 6 See, e.g., Grimm and Zoettl (2013) for the context modelled here.
in our context. This simplifies our second level problem to a constrained welfare maximization problem. Generation Capacity Limits (GCL):
Zonal First Kirchhoff's Law (ZFKL):
Market Splitting Flow Restriction (MCF):
When making investment and supply decisions, firms only consider physical constraints for which they receive price signals. If the market is not divided into zones, firms receive no signals concerning network capacities and thus, will not account for them. If the market is divided into two or more zones, firms consider those physical constraints which are expressed in price differences due to market splitting: Between any pair of zones (Z i , Z j ), electricity flow cannot exceed the maximum thermal capacity of the respective inter-zone network links -and congestion implies price differences across zones. Other physical restrictions like the phase angle determination do not play any role under market splitting. Note that in (4.4), R again denotes the respective network fee payments (as introduced in Section 2.6) that affect demand and/or generation decisions on the spot market.
We finally point to the following observations regarding the Zonal First Kirchhoff's Law. Summing up (4.7) for all zones we obtain the well known market clearing condition: simultaneously decides on redispatch for all T spot markets. 7 Reallocation of spot market outcomes is realized in a way that ensures compatibility with network constraints at the lowest possible cost. 8 The corresponding cost minimization problem (4.14) comprises of remunerations of consumers and firms that are involved in redispatch. The redispatch decision has to take into account all physical flow restrictions of installed network capacity as well as generation capacity limits, see (4.15) to (4.27) .
  (4.14) 7 Recall that we can consider redispatch separately since there are no temporal interdependencies, i.e. redispatch at time t has no effect on future supply decisions of any firm. 8 Redispatch quantities will be denoted by y while quantities that result after redispatch will be denoted by z. Note that the following relationship between different variable types always holds: z = y + x. subject to: First Kirchhoff's Law (FKL):
Transmission Flow Limits (TFL):
− 1 − z line l z f low l ≤ z f low l,t ≤ 1 − z line l z f low l ∀l ∈ L, l ∈ L ex l , t ∈ T (4.21) −z line l · z f low l ≤ z f low l,t ≤ z line l · z f low l ∀l ∈ L, l ∈ L new l , t ∈ T (4.22)
Generation Capacity Limits (GCL):
z gen g,t ≤ e gen g · x gncp g ∀n ∈ N , g ∈ G ex n , t ∈ T (4.23) z gen g,t ≤ e gen g · x gncp g ∀n ∈ N , g ∈ G new n , t ∈ T (4.24)
Spot and Redispatch Quantities (SRQ):
We conclude this section with the following relation between our integrated planning approach and the tri-level power market model: 
DECOMPOSITION OF THE TRI-LEVEL PROGRAM AND SOLUTION STRATEGY
The presented tri-level programming approach is a special case of a general multi-level programming problem that takes the following form (see also Dempe, 2002 )
. . .
with f i being a real-valued function and g i describing vectors of real-valued functions. In the case p = 1, we face a single-level problem (as our integrated planner model). It is a key feature of every multi-level optimization problem that the first level problem cannot be solved until the (conditional) solutions to the lower level problems are known and adequately incorporated into the solution process. Of course, the lower level problem(s) can in general not be solved until the optimal solution of the first level is known. These interdependencies make general multilevel problems very hard to solve. In Jeroslow (1985) it is shown that a simple linear bi-level problem is already NP-hard. Most algorithmic approaches for bi-level problems make use of some version of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and solve the resulting mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). 9 However, such problem reformulations explicitly rely on nonconvex and nondifferentiable optimization problems.
An obvious drawback is that in these problem formulations the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint In this section we will present a new decomposition approach that allows us to find a global optimal solution to the presented tri-level problem without explicitly using KKT systems. Recall that we analyze three different network fee regimes. Our basic decomposition approach for solving the tri-level programming problem will be slightly modified depending on the respective network fee regime we consider. Before we present our formal decomposition approach, we point out that the tri-level problem has always a finite global optimal solution, since the feasible region is bounded.
Basic Decomposition Idea. Our decomposition approach builds on a detailed two step analysis
of the connection between the three problem levels. In a first step, we fix all non-second level variables in the second-level problem and use them as parameters in the second level. This allows us to iteratively solve independent single-level sub problems (i.e., the second level problem for given scenarios with respect to line investment) and corresponding bi-level master problems consisting of the original first and third level problems. In a second step, we will show that instead of solving a master problem of bi-level type, we can solve an easier single-level master problem. Combining the results of step 1 and step 2, we will iteratively solve single-level sub and master problems arriving at a global optimal solution to the initial tri-level problem. Figure 6 depicts the decomposition of the tri-level problem into two independent single-level (sub and master) problems. 
We will now exploit the fact that in order to solve a general mixed-integer nonlinear bi-level problem with identical objective functions, it is possible to solve an easier single-level problem which is equivalent. This single-level problem includes both, the constraints of the upper level program and the lower level problem.
Lemma 5.2. Consider a mixed-integer nonlinear bi-level problem of the general form given in (5.1) but with identical objective functions. Denote by S B L P the solution set of the bi-level problem. Let S S L P denote the set of optimal solutions to the single-level problem (SLP) whose constraint system equals the union of the upper and lower level constraints:
Then, we have:
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Proof. Consider an optimal solution (x
) ∈ S B L P to the bi-level optimization problem.
Obviously, (x
) is also feasible for the single-level problem. Let (x
2 ) ∈ S S L P be an optimal solution to the single-level problem. Then, we get:
Now, consider an optimal solution (x
2 ) ∈ S S L P to the single-level optimization problem.
Then, there existsx
where (x
2 ) is a feasible solution to the bi-level problem and (x
) ∈ S B L P is again an optimal solution to the bi-level problem. Combining (5.2) and (5.3) we obtain:
Let us note that the above result can easily be generalized to p-level programming problems. For the sake of completeness let us also state the following theorem which is an immediate consequence: To illustrate the intuition of these results, we will apply the above theorem to an adapted mixed- with an objective value of f 1 = 4. However, by the above theorem we can also solve a single-level problem given the following relationship between the upper and lower level objective: Figure 7b ) depicts the feasible set of the corresponding single-level problem (blue lines). It shows that its optimal value coincides with the optimal bi-level objective value.
With these results our two level master problem can be solved as a single-level problem. Combining step 1 and step 2, we arrive at both single-level sub and single level master problems. Figure 6 depicts the result of our decomposition.
Linear vs. Binary Search Strategies.
In this subsection we will discuss how all the relevant sub and master problems can be evaluated in an efficient way using an inner and an outer loop.
Accounting for all possible network expansion plan and transmission fee pairs, in an inner loop we will consider fixed inter-zone network capacities and iteratively solve sub and master problems for all the relevant transmission fees. In an outer loop we will consider the different network expansion plans. In the following two subsections we will first describe a linear search strategy and then a binary search procedure.
Linear Search.
Inner Loop: Transmission Fees. Solving the decomposed tri-level problem for all possible values of the transmission fee is not possible, given that the three different transmission fees are all real valued.
Therefore, we will restrict λ, ρ and κ to the case having at most m < ∞ fractional digits. A natural choice seems m = 2, in which case we calculate a fee that is accurate to the cent. Given upper boundsλ,ρ andκ and the common lower bound zero, we need an exponential number of inner loop iterations in the input length to find a solution that is optimal for a given network expansion plan.
Outer Loop: Inter-Zone Network Expansion Plans. Not having to check all possible inter-zone network configurations, we will group construction choices that yield identical transmission capacities between zone pairs (Z k , Z l ), with Z k = Z l . By C C we will denote the set of all the relevant network configurations or construction choices that we will evaluate. Note that a reduction in sub problems is Table 1 gives the candidate transmission lines that can be build to connect the four zones. Solving the problem for all construction choices yields 2 8 = 256 different sub problems (for a given transmission fee). Grouping line construction decisions we only have to solve 4 · 2 · 3 · 3 = 72 sub problems (for a given transmission fee). Thus, in the present example we will check less than 30 percent of all existing sub problems by introducing line construction groups.
Denoting by ϕ one of the three network fees λ, κ or ρ, Algorithm 1 depicts the general structure of this solution process. Further Algorithmic Simplifications in the Case of a Lump Sum. In the case of a lump sum we can further simplify our presented search strategy. Obviousely, electricity demand is totally independent of income, i.e., the income elasticity η d,t ist zero for all d ∈ D and t ∈ T . This total inelasticity means that spot market outcomes are completely independent of the lump sum. As a consequence, our inner loop will only have one iteration. With this in mind we can solve the sub problem with a normalized lump sum of zero, drop the budget constraint in the master problem and solve this relaxed single-level master problem for fixed spot market and generation investment values. Then, we calculate ex post the transmission operator's total cost E. Given that in any optimal solution to the original problem total cost must equal total revenues R λ , the a priori unknown lump sum λ will be equal to the calculated cost. Algorithm 2 depicts the structure of this simplyfied search strategy. Substitute its optimal values x * c into the master problem and solve
In this subsection we will discuss a binary search strategy with a linear number of inner loop iterations to solve the tri-level energy market model. Given the above simplifications in the case of a lump sum, ϕ will be restricted to capacity fees κ and energy fees ρ. Let us now consider the transmission operator's budget constraint. We will explicitly define the profit function M (w, x, y, z, ϕ) with an optimal solution (and any other feasible solution) to the tri-level problem (w * , x * , y * , z * , ϕ * ) realizing a nonprofit situation, i.e., a situation with M (w * , x * , y * , z * , ϕ * ) = 0. We will further introduce the following optimal value function: Algorithm 3 depicts the structure of the binary search.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we will discuss two prominent test networks. The first example is taken from Jenabi et al. (2013) and consists of three nodes. Applying our power market model to this simple network will illustrate the scope of our approach. Our second test network is a six node example by Chao and Peck (1998) that has widely been used in the energy market literature. For both scenarios (consisting of the network structure and assumed demand and cost parameters) we will calculate i) the welfare optimum (which coincides with the market outcome of a nodal price system in our framework), as well as the market outcomes in the case of ii) a redispatch model without market splitting and iii) a redispatch model with market splitting (i.e. price zones). For the two redispatch models (ii and iii) we will consider the three different network fee regimes, a lump sum fee, an energy based fee, as well as a capacity based fee. Note that we transformed all parameters into equivalent annual hourly values.
6.1. Implementation. We implemented the redispatch model as well as the integrated planning model in ZIMPL and used SCIP's file writer to generate corresponding mps files. With these input files we solved the problems using the CPLEX interface in our Java code. All experiments were Given the importance of appropriate transmission fee bounds, we will take the following strategy.
In all transmission fee regimes we will use zero as a lower bound excluding negative transmission fees. Then, we will calculate monopoly solutions and derive the respective monopoly markups.
Based on the implicit assumption that the TO will not charge fees that are larger than monopoly markups, we use these markups to derive upper bounds. Choosing the respective upper bound, we will consider the different network fee regimes separately: In the case of a per unit fee charged for each electricity unit actually produced, we will use the average monopoly markup across all time periods and market zones as an upper bound. In the case of a per unit fee charged for each unit of capacity connected to the network, we will use the cumulative monopoly markup across all time periods where total generation capacity is binding in a given zone. To obtain the upper bound we then take averages over all market zones.
TRANSMISSION AND GENERATION INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS

FIGURE 8. 3 Node Test Network
As can easily be seen, in the capacity fee regime the calculated upper bound will in general be much larger than in the energy fee model. This immediately results in relatively long linear search solution times for the capacity fee models. Indeed, this was confirmed by our numerical examples.
In our six node example with 2 price zones, given upper capacity fee bounds between 1000 and 1500 the maximum running time amounted up to days. All other model variants including the energy fee models were solved in a few minutes or hours using a linear search procedure. In contrast, our binary search algorithm solved all problems in only a few minutes. This indicates that our binary search seems quite promising also for larger test instances. Demand Parameters. Consumers are located at node 1. We will assume the following basic linear demand function:
To give the four periods t = 1, 2, 3, 4 some simple interpretation, we will refer to them as the four seasons spring, summer, autumn and winter. For this reason, we will multiply the intercept of the above demand function by 1, 0.5, 1 and 1.5 in period 1 to 4, respectively 11 .
Numerical Results. In our three node test framework the integrated planner approach yields a social welfare of $ 1083. This would also be the welfare level under a nodal pricing model. A redispatch model with no market splitting (1 price zone) implies a welfare loss as compared to the first best solution in all three network fee regimes. In the case of a capacity based fee, an electricity based fee and a lump sum fee the realized welfare levels are $ 1050, $ 1044 and $ 1040, respectively. This welfare loss is mainly driven by a distortion of generation investment: As Figure 9 illustrates, the optimal solution implies positive investment in both technologies, where investment in technology 1 is much larger, however. The tri-level power market model, on the contrary, yields generation investment only in technology 1. Investment in technology 1 is higher than in the welfare optimum for all network fee regimes (lowest for capacity based fees, highest for lump sum fees).
The candidate line connecting the two nodes 2 and 3 is build in all three scenarios, and also in the welfare optimum. Introducing a second price zone does not change the presented results. This can be explained by the fact that no matter how the two price zones are designed, there is always at least one non-congested line that connects the two zones. This suggests that a meaningful analysis of market splitting requires larger networks. Average availability of capacity is 80%.
Demand Parameters. Demand is located at nodes 3, 5 and 6 (see the blue dots in Figure 11 ). The basic demand parameters used in our numerical example are provided in Table 3 . Assuming these three basic demand functions taken from Chao and Peck (1998) we use real world data to induce 12 In particular, we use factors derived from the German 2011 demand realizations for shifting the above demand functions. Demand levels across nodes in a given period are always shifted by the same factor, which accounts for the fact that typically the level of demand in a given period is correlated across demand nodes.
Numerical Results. Figure 12 illustrates welfare in the scenarios with one and two price zones, respectively, as compared the the welfare optimum. Obviously, market splitting increases welfare but does not achieve the maximum possible level. Whereas welfare levels under different network tariff regimes are rather similar with two price zones we find substantial welfare differences for different network regimes without market splitting. generators is relatively low in the absence of line investment, generation capacity is build up at node 2, where investment cost is lower than at node 1, but unit production cost is higher.
Turing to the case of a power market without market splitting, we find that both candidate lines are built and that generation capacity is exclusively installed at node 1. The intuition is straightforward:
Recall that we have no price zones and that transmission constraints are not accounted for at the operate. Consequently, all capacity investment occurs at the node where the sum of production and investment cost is lowest given that the whole market has to be supplied -which is at node 1.
Anticipating this decision, the social planner prefers to install both candidate lines (except for the case of a lump sum network fee).
Finally, consider the scenario with two price zones, north and south. Obviously, market splitting allows a generator in the south to earn rents whenever it is impossible to satisfy demand in the south by production from northern generators due to transmission constraints. Thus, firms have an incentive to install capacity at node 4, which in turn decreases the incentives of the social planer to install additional transmission capacity. Consequently, anticipation of generation investment at node 4 leads to less transmission investment by the TO -only one line is built. Thus, market splitting moves the whole system closer to the welfare optimal scenario.
Prices in Figure 14 support the above intuition for the case of the energy based fee. In the welfare optimal solution, prices at the consumption nodes are low in the north (node 3) and high in the south (nodes 5 and 6). With one price zones, the spot market price is relatively high, however, generators with high unit production cost have no chance to contract their supply at the spot market. Two price zones imply also a north south spread which allows the southern generators to recover their investment cost.
Overall, the 6-node test examples nicely illustrates the capability of our framework to identify the effects of different regulatory regimes and to potentially quantify them.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This article analyzes the long run impact of different transmission management regimes on investment incentives of generating firms in a market environment with a regulated transmission operator.
We propose a tri-level programming approach to model an electricity market with redispatch both, with and without market splitting. As a First Best benchmark we also solve the corresponding integrated planer problem where an Integrated Generation and Transmission Company (as a central planer) controls both the, grid and generation units. In order to solve our tri-level problem numerically, we present a decomposition approach that relies on a detailed analysis of interconnection between the three problem levels. We apply our approach to two simple test problems in order to demonstrate the capabilities to analyze transmission and capacity expansion in a market environment with the proposed methodology.
Our results clearly show that in a market environment investment choices by the transmission operator and private firms can substantially differ from socially optimal choices. Obviously, investment in generation units is driven by the incentives for private investors induced by the particular market In this subsection we will present all the sets, parameters and variables used in our models. 
